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1 Introduction
The twentieth century has witnessed a spectacular rise in women’s participation to the labor
market. Around 1900, one in five women of working age was in gainful employment in
the US. A hundred years later, the female employment rate had risen to two thirds of the
working age population, accompanied by gradual gender convergence in wages and earnings,
and the entry of women in occupations traditionally occupied by men (Goldin, 2006). Similar
changes were taking place in all economically advanced countries, albeit with varying time
lags with respect to the US experience.
These developments have generated a vast body of work, studying womens changing role
in the economy and the underlying driving forces. A widely documented phenomenon is the
female gain in human capital accumulation, leading to narrowing and then reversing gender
gaps in college completion rates.1 Meanwhile, medical advances have reduced fertility via
the introduction of oral contraceptives, improved maternal health, and provided substitutes
to maternal lactation. Another relevant factor is the introduction of antidiscrimination
legislation in most countries, which was more recently accompanied by affirmative action
aimed at removing entry barriers in male-dominated, high-income occupations (see Goldin,
2006, Bertrand, 2011, and Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2016, for a discussion of these forces and
a survey of the literature). Besides these gender-specific trends, gender-neutral changes such
as the rise in the service economy were creating cleaner and less physically demanding jobs
in which women may have a comparative advantage, whether innate or acquired (Ngai and
Petrongolo, 2017). Closely knit to these economic and institutional changes was the evolution
of gender identity norms, which slowly but steadily reshaped women’s aspirations and societal
perceptions about appropriate gender roles in the household and the labor market (Goldin,
2006; Bertrand, 2011). Women’s changing role in the labor market has also spurred – and
was often reinforced by – government intervention and firm policies targeting families and
in particular offering women the opportunity to combine careers and motherhood (Olivetti
and Petrongolo, 2017).
1While the gap in overall college graduation rates has reversed, women are still underrepresented in STEM
fields, typically conducive to both higher earnings and aggregate growth. Thus female gains in human capital
accumulation may be overstated by simple evidence on years of education (OECD, 2015).
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Despite decades of progress, gender convergence has recently slowed down (most notably
in the US), and sizable gaps remain in most indicators of gender success. Women in the
US earn about 18% less than men (on an hourly basis) and their employment rates are 10
percentage points lower. In the UK, gender differences closely replicate the US picture, with a
20% wage gap and an employment gap of 9 percentage points. In most continental European
countries wage gaps are narrower, but employment gaps are substantially larger. In all
countries women are still under-represented in high-income, high-status occupations. Large
and persistent gaps are especially remarkable in light of equalized education opportunities
and equal pay legislation gradually adopted in most countries since World War II.
The causes of remaining gender inequalities are actively debated in current labor re-
search. While traditional human capital factors such as education and experience can no
longer explain earnings or employment differentials, other aspects of labor market attach-
ment still seem to differ between men and women. A strand of the literature has highlighted
gender differences in preferences and psychological traits, whether innate or shaped by social
contexts, leading to women’s underrepresentation in the upper part of the earnings distri-
bution. Based on experimental evidence from the lab and, more recently, from real-world
settings, a large body of work has documented some gender differences in attitudes towards
risk, competition and negotiation, which may interfere with labor market success whenever
financially rewarding careers develop in highly-competitive environments, characterized by
volatile earnings (see Croson and Gneezy, 2009, Bertrand, 2011, and Azmat and Petrongolo,
2014, for surveys). Among studies that directly relate such differences in attitudes to the
gender gap in earnings, the portion of the earnings gap explained remains relatively modest
(Blau and Kahn, 2017).
Another strand of work has mostly emphasized women’s role of primary providers of
childcare and home production, which sets limits to their labor market engagement. As
a likely consequence of worklife balance considerations, women typically work shorter or
more irregular hours than men, are more likely to take career breaks, and specialize in
different occupations and industries. These work dimensions may only marginally contribute
to differential accumulation of actual work experience, but could still contribute to gender
gaps via differences in job search behavior and compensating pay differentials associated
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to job characteristics especially favored by women, such as short or flexible hours, atypical
work arrangements, or shorter commutes, to name a few (Goldin, 2014; Blau and Kahn,
2017; Bertrand, 2018). Indeed, childbirth drives large and persistent wedges between the
earnings of mothers and fathers (Kleven et al, 2019a).
In this paper we discuss some strands of the recent literature on the evolution of gender
gaps and their driving forces, expanding on our previous work on these topics and exploring
avenues for future research.2 We will start in Section 2 by revisiting a few stylized facts about
gender gaps in employment and wages in a few high-income countries. Most of the evidence
presented refers to the US and the UK, with a few comparisons with major continental
European countries. Section 3 discusses and builds on one gender-neutral force behind the
rise in female employment, namely the rise of the service economy, to the detriment of the
manufacturing sector and home-produced services, and will describe how both mechanisms
may be conducive to a rise in female employment. We will then relate the growth in service
jobs to the polarization of employment, which in the US is much more pronounced for women
than for men, and to the geographic distribution of jobs, which is predicted to be especially
relevant for female employment prospects.
Section 4 will turn to currently debated causes of remaining gender gaps and discusses
potential labor market consequences of women’s heavier caring responsibilities in the house-
hold. In particular, we will highlight how women’s stronger distaste for commuting time
may feed into gender pay gaps by limiting women’s job opportunities. Evidence for a few
countries shows that women on average commute shorter distances than men, and that the
age profile in the gender commuting gap closely mimics the age profile in the earnings gap.
Relatedly, women gain less than men from job mobility in terms of earnings, but gain more
in terms of vicinity to new workplaces, consistent with stronger willingness than men to
trade off wage gains for shorter commutes. Section 5 concludes with summary views and
open questions for future research.
2By zooming in on a few topics of interest, this paper does not aim to provide a comprehensive survey of
the literature on gender gaps in labor market outcomes. Recent, comprehensive overviews can be found in
Blau and Kahn (2017) and Betrand (2018), among others.
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2 Evidence on gender gaps
Panel A in Figure 1 illustrates the growth in female employment in the US and the UK for
the longest time span over which a consistent employment measure is available. For the US,
we combine Census and ILO sources and, for the UK, we combine Census and ONS sources.
At the end of WW2, about one third of US women aged 15-64 were in work, with their
employment rate rising to two thirds at the turn of the century, and some slight reversal
since then. Over the second half of the twentieth century, female employment in the US
was growing on average by 0.72 percentage points a year, and most of this increase was
driven by the participation of married women to the labor market (Goldin, 2006). The UK
series shows a similar pattern, albeit with slightly slower growth before 2000, and virtually
no reversal afterwards. Panel B shows corresponding (though more recent) trends in some
large continental European countries. Except in Sweden, where the female employment rate
stays between 70% and 80% during most of the sample period, female employment has been
growing steadily over the past few decades, with some mild cross-country convergence.
While these trends have been documented in various country-level studies, something
that is important to remark is that sustained gains in female employment were a distinctive
feature of the post-war period rather than a historical necessity. Pre-WW2 data on partic-
ipation assembled by Mitchell (1998a, b, c) and Goldin (1995) show important declines in
female participation during 1850-1950 in several countries (see also Olivetti and Petrongolo,
2014, for overview evidence). The ensuing U-shaped relationship between female partici-
pation and development has been associated to the reallocation of labor across the broad
sectors of agriculture, manufacturing, and services, known as structural transformation. At
very low levels of economic developments, female participation is high and concentrated in
agriculture and/or family businesses. At later stages of development, female participation
falls due to both income effects and the expansion of modern manufacturing industries, in
which women have been historically under-represented due to both social customs and com-
parative advantages (Goldin, 1995). The post-WW2 rise in female employment rates has
been accompanied in all high-income countries by the rise in the service sector.
Gains in female employment over the past few decades have been accompanied by nar-
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rowing gaps in earnings. Panel A in Figure 2 shows steadily falling gaps in median earnings
of fulltime employees both in the US and the UK, from around 40 log points in the early
1970s, to below 20 points in recent years. This substantial decline in gender inequality stands
in sharp contrast with most other dimensions of inequality, which were indeed growing over
the same period (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). In continental Europe (Panel B, Figure 2),
wage convergence has been more modest, but overall gender gaps in earnings are markedly
lower than in the UK and the US. Except in Sweden, an important portion of these inter-
national differences is explained by employment selection effects, whereby high employment
gaps, especially in southern Europe, are reflected into low wage gaps whenever low-wage
women are less likely to feature in the observed wage distribution (Olivetti and Petrongolo,
2008).
Table 1 shows more detailed evidence on raw and adjusted wage gaps on the latest data
for the US and the UK, covering all employees. The raw wage gap in the US in 2017 was
18.4% (column 1), rising to 23.1% once age and education controls are included (column
2). Unsurprisingly, the inclusion of education controls implies a larger unexplained wage
gap, as a consequence of the female advantage in college graduation rates for all cohorts
born since the late 1950s. Controlling for 2-digit industries in column 3 explains about one
fifth of the wage gap, and the combination of industry and occupation controls in column
3 explains about one third of the wage gap. The picture is qualitatively similar in the UK
(columns 5-8), where industry and occupation controls jointly explain 44% of the wage gap.
Understanding women’s sorting across industries and occupations is therefore key to explain
an important portion of remaining gender gaps.
3 Gender gaps and the industry structure
3.1 Female employment growth and the rise in services
The post-war rise in female participation to the labor market was accompanied by another
salient economic transformation, namely the rise of the service economy. Figure 3 illustrates
the steady rise in the share of services in the US and the UK, measured by the proportion of
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weekly hours worked in all service industries combined. In the US, the share of services rose
from about 50% to 77% of total hours between 1940 and 2017. In the UK, a similar rise in
the service share took place over the second half of this period alone. In the US, the growth
in services was accompanied by a fall in agricultural employment until about 1960, and a
fall in manufacturing employment thereafter. During the (more recent) UK sample period,
the whole growth in services happened to the detriment of manufacturing employment.
The rise in services is linked to both structural transformation, and specifically labor
reallocation from agriculture and manufacturing into services, and marketization, which has
outsourced to the market several services traditionally produced in the household (Ngai and
Pissarides, 2008). There are important reasons why structural transformation and mar-
ketization can contribute to the rise in female market hours and relative wages. First, the
production of services is relatively less intensive in the use of brawn skills than the production
of goods, of which women are less endowed. Thus the rise in the service sector has created
jobs for which women have a natural comparative advantage (see, among others, Goldin,
2006; Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017; Rendall, 2018). While the introduction of new technolo-
gies has progressively shifted labor requirements from physical to intellectual tasks – whereby
largely compensating the female disadvantage in physically demanding jobs – women may
retain a comparative advantage in services, innate or acquired, related to the more intensive
use of communication and interpersonal skills, which are valuable in the provision of services
and cannot be easily automated (Borghans, Bas ter Weel and Weinberg, 2008). Women’s
comparative advantage in services is reflected in the allocation of women’s hours of market
work. In 1940, the average working woman in the US was spending three quarters of her
working time in the service sector, while the average working man was spending less than
45% of his time in it. As structural transformation expands the sector in which women are
over-represented at baseline, it predicts an increase in female hours even at constant female
intensity within each sector.
The second channel is related to women’s involvement in household work. Ramey (2009)
estimates that, in 1940, women in the US spent on average 42 hours per week in home
production, while men spent on average 7.7 hours. Household work includes child care,
cleaning, food preparation, and more in general activities that have close substitutes in the
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market service sector. Productivity growth in market services makes it cheaper to outsource
these activities and would draw women’s work from the household to the market.
In a nutshell, while women were predominantly engaged in home production or employed
in the service sector, and thus their market hours were boosted by the rise in services, men
were predominantly working in goods-producing industries, and the trend in their working
hours mostly reflected the process of de-industrialization. The series for US working hours
plotted in Figure 4 gives support to these ideas. Panel A shows that the service sector, which
was the main employer of female labor throughout the period, absorbed the whole (net)
increase in women’s working hours since the 1940s, while female hours in goods-producing
industries (including manufacturing, construction, utilities and primary sectors) were very
low and quite stable for more than seven decades. Conversely, Panel B shows that the whole
(net) decline in male hours over the same period took place in the goods sector. While overall
male hours were falling, male hours in services were actually rising, and the service sector
became the main employer of male hours during the 1960s. Corresponding and qualitatively
similar trends for the UK are reported in Figure 5. As the rise in services was more recent
in the UK than in the US, as of 1980 men in the UK were still working more hours in goods
than services, before the heavy decline in UK manufacturing of the 1980s and 1990s.
We next quantify (in an accounting sense) the role of the growth of services in the
evolution of female employment. Using a standard shift-share decomposition on two sectors









where lft denotes the share of female hours in the economy in year t, ljt denotes the hours
share of sector j, lfjt denotes the share of female hours in sector j, and αfj = (lfj0 + lfjt) /2
and αj = (lj0 + ljt) /2 are decomposition weights. The first term in equation (1) represents
the change in the female hours share that is attributable to changes in sector shares, at given
female intensity within sectors, while the second term reflects changes in the female intensity
within sectors. The results of this decomposition are reported in Table 2.
The first row in the Table gives evidence of the rise in female hours in each country.
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In 1940, women represented 23% of total labor inputs in the US, and this figure nearly
doubled by 2017. In the UK, the share of female hours rose from 0.31 in 1977 to 0.42 in
2017. As the US sample period is roughly double the UK sample period, the female share
was growing at similar rates in the two countries. The rise in the female hours share was
mostly driven by the absolute rise in female hours and, to a lesser extent, the fall in male
hours (see Figures 4 and 5). The third and sixth entry in the first row give the left-hand side
of equation 1 for each country. The second and third row report the intensity of the goods
and service sector, respectively, in the use of female hours. In all data points the service
sector was more than twice as intensive in female labor than the goods sector. The average
of the female intensity between the start and the end of the sample period is used to obtain
decomposition weights αj. The fourth row reports the share of services. The overall rise in
services (∆ljt) was virtually identical in the two countries over the respective sample periods,
which implies a twice faster growth in UK services during 1977-2017. The fifth row shows




This amounts to about one third in the US and almost twice as much in the UK.
While Table 2 is based on a coarse distinction between goods and services, finer disag-
gregations yield results that are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. For the
US, a decomposition over 15 industries gives a between-industry contribution of 31%. For
the UK, a decomposition over 8 industries gives a between-industry contribution of 57%.
For a larger sample of 17 high-income countries, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016) obtain an
overall between-industry component of about 50%, whether on a two-fold or 12-fold in-
dustry classification of employment, and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014) compute that the
between-industry component of labor demand shifts explains roughly one-third of the overall
cross-country variation in wage and hours gaps.3
Ngai and Petrongolo (2017) propose a three-sector model with uneven productivity
growth to rationalize these facts. Their market economy has two sectors, producing com-
3While the rise in services has contributed to rising female employment in the post-war period, going
forward we should not expect much further progress in employment convergence due to structural tranforma-
tion in the developed world. One important factor is that the rise in the service share observed in the second
half of the 20th century is – as one would expect – flattening out in recent years, having surpassed 75% of
total employment in several high-income countries. The other factor is the gradual gender convergence in
the distribution of employment, which is going to erode women’s over-representation in the service sector.
9
modities – goods and services, respectively – that are poor substitutes for each other in
consumer preferences, while the home sector produces services that are good substitutes to
market services. Production in each sector involves a combination of male and female work,
and women have a comparative advantage in producing services, both in the market and in
the home. Uneven productivity growth reduces both the cost of producing goods, relative
to services, and the cost of producing market services, relative to home services. As goods
and services are poor substitutes in preferences, faster productivity growth in the goods sec-
tor reallocates hours of work from goods to services, resulting in structural transformation.
As market and home services are good substitutes, slower productivity growth in the home
sector reallocates hours from home to market services, resulting in marketization.
The combination of consumer’s taste for variety and uneven productivity growth imply
that structural transformation and marketization jointly raise women’s relative market hours
and wages. In other words, gender comparative advantages imply that a gender-neutral force
such as the rise in services de facto produces gender-biased impacts. When the model is cali-
brated to the evolution of the U.S. labor market, marketization and structural transformation
forces predict the entire rise in the service share between 1970 and 2006, 20% of the gender
convergence in wages, one third of the rise in female market hours, and 9% of the fall in
male market hours.
3.2 Female employment polarization and the rise in services
The rise in services is also closely related to the polarization of employment, characterized by
rising employment shares at the upper and lower ends of the occupational/skill distribution,
and a decline in the middle (see, among others, pioneer work by Autor, Katz and Kearney,
2006, and Goos and Manning, 2007). Panel A in Figure 6 shows evidence of employment
polarization in the US over 330 occupations that have been ranked on the horizontal axis
according to their mean log hourly wage in 1980. The black line represents the well known
polarization trend since 1980 for total employment (see Autor and Dorn, 2013), with circles
representing the size of occupation cells. Something that has only been recently highlighted
is the differential employment polarization across genders (Cerina, Moro and Rendall, 2018).
The blue and red lines in Figure 6 decompose occupational employment growth into male
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and female components, respectively, and show that most of the overall polarization pattern
is driven by female employment dynamics. In particular, the rise in low-skill female employ-
ment fills up the whole left tail of the polarization graph, and the rise in high-skill female
employment fills-up most of the right tail, with moderate declines in the middle. For men,
the graph shows employment losses throughout most of the occupation distribution, with
small gains only at the very top.
Autor and Dorn (2013) show that labor reallocation into low-skill service occupations –
in turn driven by routinization of mid-skill tasks – has shaped most of the upward tilt in
the left tail of the employment growth distribution. Here we illustrate how the association
between tasks/occupations and sectors allows to relate polarization to sector shares. Panel
B in Figure 6 illustrates the role of services – both low- and high-skill – in male and female
employment dynamics, by plotting the (smoothed) service intensity of each occupation.
This is obtained as the share of each occupation that is employed in the broad service sector
in 1980, defined as in the notes to Figure 3. The service intensity is highest for low-pay
occupations, whose growth is entirely driven by female employment, and – after declining
for most of the occupation distribution – it rises again for highest-paid occupations, whose
growth is driven by both male and female employment.
Cerina, Moro and Rendall (2018) rationalize these patterns in a multisector model with
uneven productivity growth and skill-biased technical change. The market service sector is
decomposed into high-end services, which are skill-intensive and typically do not have home-
produced substitutes, and low-end services, which are low-skill intensive and tend to have
close home-produced substitutes. The skill and gender dimensions bring further insights
to the polarization story. While marketization of home production drives the growth in
low-end services, skill upgrading drives growth in high-end services and both forces have
female-friendly consequences via comparative advantages. Their model calibration to the
US economy in 1980 and 2008 broadly replicates polarization patterns by gender.
Evidence for the UK is shown in Figure 7. The sample period starts in 1994, when infor-
mation on hourly wage data becomes available in the UK LFS, and the need for a consistent
classification on occupations over time restricts us to a coarser disaggregation into 55 cate-
gories. The main difference with respect to the US experience is that the polarization pattern
11
is very similar for men and women (Panel A), but similarly as in the US employment growth
for either gender is concentrated in occupations with relatively higher service intensity.
3.3 Services in local labor markets
The facts discussed above highlight important synergies between the rise in services and
female employment – over time, across countries, and in the context of employment polar-
ization. We finally document a largely unexplored feature of most service industries, namely
that they tend to be less geographically clustered than goods-producing industries. By pro-
ducing output that is predominantly non traded, service jobs tend to be within closer reach
from most residential locations. This may have consequences for female employment in so
far as women have stronger preferences for shorter commutes, and we’ll show evidence on
this in the next section.
To present evidence on the geographic concentration of jobs in various industries, we use
administrative data for the UK, combining information on demographics and industry of
employment for a 1% sample of employees from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
(ASHE, ONS 2019a)4 with information on establishment location and industry affiliation for
the universe of businesses from the Business Statistics Database (BSD, ONS 2019b).5
We first compute an index of employment clustering for each 2-digit industry (58 cate-






∣∣∣∣LajLj − La − LajL− Lj
∣∣∣∣ , (2)
where notation L stands for employment and subscripts j and a denote industries and
wards, respectively. There are about 9,400 wards in the UK, with an average population
4The ASHE is an employer-based survey, covering a 1% sample of employee jobs in the UK, randomly
selected from the HM Revenue and Customs’ Pay As You Earn records. The survey is carried out in April
of each year, starting in 1997. It represents the main administrative data source on UK employees and
contains information on personal and work-related variables, as well as fine-grained geographic identifiers for
employees’ residences and workplaces.
5The BSD is an employer-based annual survey (1997-) that covers the near universe of business orga-
nizations in the UK. It combines data collected by HM Revenue and Customs via VAT and Pay As You
Earn records and ONS business surveys. Relevant information is recorded at both the firm and establishment
level. In our analysis we use establishment-level information on sector, size and location. A consistent 2-digit
industry classification can be obtained in the BSD from 2006 onwards.
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of 7,000. The intuition behind the geographic concentration index in equation (2) is that
it indicates the share of workers in a certain industry who would need to spatially relocate
for the industry to be equally represented in every ward. We compute Cj on the BSD,
using averages of employment shares over the 2006-2018 period. The interesting stylized
fact is that goods-producing industries are on average more geographically clustered than
service industries: the respective average cluster indexes are 0.53 and 0.38, using industry
employment as weights.
We combine this information with the share of female employment at the industry-level,
obtained from ASHE over the same sample period. The two indicators are plotted against
each other in Figure 8. Red dots represent service industries while blue dots represent
goods-producing industries, and the fitted line has slope −0.62∗∗∗ using unweighted industry
observations, and −0.56∗∗∗ using industry size as weights.6 Figure 8 shows that industries
where women tend to be over-represented are also more geographically dispersed, which
means that service jobs are on average within shorter commuting distances from any given
location. Shorter commutes are especially attractive to women, with potential consequences
for gender gaps, as it will be discussed below.
4 Gender in local labor markets
4.1 The earnings penalties to work-life balance
A growing body of work on the causes of remaining gender inequalities in the labor market
has brought the emphasis to work-life balance considerations and mothers’ demands for
family-friendly working conditions. Despite the long-run decrease in the time spent in home-
production tasks, women remain the main provider of child care, as well as domestic work in
general, and the literature has long suggested that women may especially value job attributes
that make careers better compatible with domestic responsibilities (Polachek, 1981; Gronau,
1988). Preferences for such attributes may set limits to women’s labor market involvement,
6Based on the same clustering index, Benson (2014) highlights a negative correlation between occupation
(rather than industry) clustering and the occupational female intensity and suggests that segregation of
women into geographically dispersed occupations eases geographic relocation of two-earner households.
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with a detrimental impact on their earnings in professions that reward a continuous labor
market attachment and inflexible work schedules.
The key component of domestic work is related to the presence of children. A few studies
have shown that childless women have similar earning trajectories to men, but parenthood
drives sizable and persistent gaps in the employment rates, working hours and earnings of
mothers and fathers (see Adda et al, 2017; Angelov et al, 2016; Kleven et al, 2019a,b).
Over the past few decades, the earnings penalty associated to motherhood has remained
remarkably stable, while other dimensions of gender inequalities, related to human capital
differences or discrimination in hiring and pay, were rapidly falling. Hence the motherhood
penalty currently captures the bulk of remaining earning gaps.
The detrimental impact of motherhood on earnings was hardly dented by a series of
developments that would be expected to ease women’s work-life balance. Medical progress
has reduced health complications around pregnancy and birth and provided substitutes to
maternal lactation (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2016); time-saving technologies embodied in con-
sumer durables have released labor from home production (Greenwood et al, 2005); and
unskilled migration to most high-income countries has provided substitutes to female work
in the household (Cortés and Tessada, 2011). Interestingly, Kleven et al (2019c) find that
the motherhood penalty is largely unaffected by the duration of parental leave rights and
the availability of subsidized childcare.
A plausible explanation for differential impacts of children on maternal and paternal earn-
ings seems instead to be the influence of gendered norms, which may prescribe “appropriate”
roles for men and women in the household and the labor market (Kleven et al, 2019b). In
other words, if gender roles within the household were equalized, parenthood would not be
any more detrimental to female rather than male careers. The role played by gender norms
has attracted increasing attention in the study of gender gaps. Fortin (2005) highlights a
clear, negative correlation between conservative gender norms and female employment rates
across OECD countries, Bertrand et al (2015, 2018) and Bursztyn et al (2017) study the role
of gender identity in the interplay between marriage and labor market opportunities and
outcomes, and Ichino et al (2019) study their impact on the spousal division of childcare.
While one may argue that different gender roles reflect at least in part gender differences
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in preferences, the influence of prescritive norms on behavior makes it hard to draw a clear
distinction between preferences and constraints. In particular, preferences may mostly in-
ternalize prescriptive norms whenever group identity induce certain behaviors and choices
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).
Gender differences in labor market attachment could act as mediators for the mother-
hood penalty. Several high-income, high-status jobs penalize the demand for flexibility and
career breaks typically associated with parenthood and child care (Bertrand et al, 2010;
Bertrand, 2018). Evidence from the US medical profession shows that women are less likely
to enter specialties characterized by especially long hours, and that mandated reductions in
weekly hours attract women disproportionately more than men into high-earnings specialties,
thereby decreasing gender pay gaps among physicians (Wassermann, 2019). There is also
evidence that women place a higher value on flexible work arrangements and the opportunity
of working from home than men, to the detriment of pay (Mas and Pallais, 2017; Wiswall
and Zafar, 2018), and professions that introduced greater flexibility in their organization
have achieved greater reductions in their earnings gap than professions that have fostered
a long-hour culture (Goldin, 2014). These mechanisms seem to impact female earnings via
compensating wage differentials rather than the associated loss in the accumulation of actual
labor market experience (Flabbi and Moro, 2012).
Another potential but under-explored channel of impact is women’s stronger preference
for shorter work commutes. Commute is an important job attribute, which matters signif-
icantly for job satisfaction and subjective well-being in general (Clark et al, 2019), and a
few studies have detected a positive and robust relationship between commuting and wages
(Manning, 2003a, and references therein). If women take a larger share of caring responsibil-
ities in the home, they are restricted in the distance they can travel to work, with potential
consequences on their job search targets and earnings.
4.2 Gender gaps in commuting and pay
Women have on average shorter commutes than men. For the UK, recently published evi-
dence by ONS (2019c) shows that male and female employees spend on average 32.5 and 25
minutes, respectively, in their one-way commute to work and, while both male and female
15
commutes have been gradually rising over time, the associated gap has been fairly stable (see
also Manning, 2003b, for further evidence on the UK, Le Barbanchon et al, 2019, for evidence
on France and Hassink and Meekes, 2019, for evidence on the Netherlands). Evidence also
shows that women are more likely than men to quit their job over a long commute (ONS,
2019c). If women are restricted in their search for higher-paying job opportunities, they may
face more monopsonistic labor markets than men and, for given labor market conditions,
they may be more willing to accept compensating wage penalties for shorter commutes.
Figure 9 plots estimates of gender commuting gaps (red plot) against wage gaps (blue
plot) for the UK, during 2002-2019. Commuting distances are calculated in the ASHE data
as the geometric distance between an employee’s postcode of residence and their postcode of
work.7 The estimates plotted are obtained in separate regressions for (log) wages and (log)
commuting distance, including interactions between gender and unrestricted age effects, as
well as a set of worker and job covariates. Upon labor market entry, men and women have
fairly similar commutes, but the gap in commutes rapidly grows throughout childbearing
years, averaging 36 log points in the 40s and nearing 40 log points in the 50s.8 Despite
different overall levels, the life-cycle pattern of gender differences in commuting behavior
closely resembles the life-cycle pattern of the gender wage gap, which starts close to zero
and again widens up in correspondence of child-bearing years.
While the ASHE data does not provide information on childbirth, Kleven et al (2019b)
show evidence of widening earning gaps in correspondence of childbirth for the UK and a few
other countries. For commutes, UK data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
contain longitudinal information on both childbirth and usual commuting times and Figure
10 illustrates that commuting duration starts to diverge for mothers and fathers around four
years after the birth of their first child, with a long-run gender gap in commuting times
7There are about 1.8 million postcodes in the UK, with an average of 15 living units in each. Information
on the postcode of residence is recorded for the first time in the ASHE in 2002. The mean one way commute
calculated across postcodes is 24.3 km for men and 15.7 km for women. Median commutes are 8.7 and 5.6
km, respectively. We drop observations with commuting distances above 313 km, which corresponds to the
99th percentile.
8The raw commuting gap follows the same pattern as the adjusted gap shown in Figure 9, but is higher
at each point in the life-cycle: it starts off around 15 log points in the early 20s and peaks at 68 log points
in the mid-50s. ONS (2019a) computes commuting times across UK postcodes using a trip planner app,
and the results on commuting gaps based on travel time are very similar to those based on travel distance,
reported here.
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of about 24%. Ten years after birth, the estimated gap amounts to about 10 minutes in
one-way commuting times.
Le Barbanchon et al. (2019) show comparable evidence on the age profile of wage and
commuting gaps using administrative data on unemployed jobseekers in France. They com-
bine self-reported information on acceptable wage offers and acceptable commutes during
job search with information on post-unemployment outcomes in wages and commuting dis-
tances. Gender gaps in reservation wages, post-unemployment wages, acceptable commutes
and realized commutes all widen with age, and an important portion of the these gaps is
related to the presence of children.9 To interpret gender differences in job search targets and
post-unemployment outcomes, the authors propose a job search model in which jobseekers
value both wages and proximity to prospective workplaces. Men and women face the same
arrival rate of job offers and wage offer distributions, but may differ in their respective val-
uations of wages and proximity. By comparing acceptable job characteristics with realized
outcomes, they estimate that women have a higher distaste for commute, which implies they
are willing to trade-off a higher portion of potential earnings for being able to work closer to
their homes. Model calibration for men and women with different household compositions
predicts that gender gaps in the distaste for commute explain around 10% of wage gaps, but
such percentage does not vary systematically with household size.
Administrative data for the UK only cover people in employment and we are thus unable
to combine job search targets with post-unemployment outcomes to estimate jobseekers’
willingness to pay for shorter commutes. But insights on the trade-off between wages and
commuting distances can be extended to job-to-job transitions, which are – to some approx-
imation – observed in the ASHE. Whenever a worker voluntarily moves job, the utility in
the new job is at least as high as the utility in the old job. By comparing wage and commute
combinations in old and new jobs, we infer gender differentials in the willingness to pay for
commuting distance.
Job moves are identified in the ASHE via information on the year and month in which
the current job has started. As information is collected in April of each year, we classify
an employee as being in a new job whenever the start date of the current job is later than
9See also Lundborg et al. (2017) for evidence on the impact of motherhood on commuting behavior.
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the previous April, i.e. during the previous 12 months. However, as the ASHE does not
provide information on the end date of the previous job, some job transitions may involve an
intervening unemployment spell, in which case job mobility may be involuntary, and there
is no guarantee that the wage-commute combination in the new job dominates the wage-
commute combination in the old job. We therefore also consider a more restrictive definition
of job mobility, within 6 months of the previous survey date.
Table 3 shows evidence on gender differences in the returns to job mobility. The depen-
dent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the change in log hourly wages between two consecutive
jobs; in columns 3 and 4 it is the corresponding change in the log commuting distance. The
sample in Panel A includes all cases of job mobility between two consecutive survey dates.
Estimates reported in column 1 imply that women have very similar wage returns to job
mobility as men, around 6.8%. In column 2 we control for worker and lagged job charac-
teristics and the coefficient on the gender dummy stays virtually unchanged. Results from
the (log) distance regression in column 3 show that job mobility is on average associated
with longer commutes, but less so for women than for men. The gender differential in the
change in distance widens markedly when we include controls in column 4. In Panel B we
only include job transitions that take place within six months of the previous interview date.
This should limit the incidence of intervening unemployment spells, and better identify cases
of voluntary mobility, associated with preferred combinations of wages and commutes. As
expected, on average job mobility is associated with larger wage gains and smaller distance
increases than in Panel A (see columns 1 and 3, respectively). Upon changing job, women
lose with respect to men in terms of wage growth, but gain in terms of proximity to work,
consistent with the view that they attribute a higher value to short commutes than men.
We argued above that job mobility makes men and women strictly better off on average in
terms of wages and distance combinations. We next attempt to estimate the marginal rate of
substitution between wages and distance that would make them indifferent between one job
and the next, adapting the unemployed search framework developed by Le Barbanchon et
al (2019) to job-to-job transitions. Let’s assume that indifference curves between wages and
distance can be approximated by a log-linear relationship w = α+βd, where w and d denote
log wages and log distance, respectively, and β is the parameter of interest, measuring the
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willingness to pay for proximity to work. Consider a worker i who is initially employed in Job
0, characterized by d0i and w0i, as represented in Figure 11. If the worker moves voluntarily
to Job 1, characterized by d1i and w1i, the (d1i, w1i) bundle should be located somewhere
above a hypothetical indifference curve passing through (d0i, w0i), with an unknown positive
slope β. The intercept α is pinned down by the restriction that the indifference curve goes
through (d0i, w0i), hence α = w0 − βd0. This leaves one free parameter (β) to be identified.
To identify β, we pool all cases of job mobility and let the wage-distance indifference
curve rotate on the initial (d0i, w0i) bundle, so as to minimize the distance from the curve
of all newly-accepted bundles (d1i, w1i) that would sit below the curve itself. This procedure
minimizes ex-post utility losses from job mobility, which would not be consistent with the
assumed framework.10 Formally:






s. to w1i < w0i + β(d1i − d0i),
where Dβ,d0i,w0i(d1i, w1i) denotes the Euclidean distance between point (d1i, w1i) and the line
w = w0i + β(d− d0i), and the constraint identifies bundles that would sit below the line.
The intuition is as follows. Imagine that individuals value wage gains, but attach no value
to shorter commutes. The job mobility data would contain a large mass of observations above
the w0 line, not systematically to the right or to the left of the d0 line, as represented by
the area shaded in light blue in Figure 11. The indifference curve that best represents these
preferences is flat (β = 0), so as to minimize the mass of observations below the w0 line,
weighted by their distance to the curve. Consider now the opposite case, in which individuals
value shorter commutes but are ambivalent about wage changes. One would expect a large
mass of observations to the left of the d0 line, not systematically above or below the w0 line,
as represented by the area shaded in yellow. Indifference curves that best represent these
preferences are vertical (β → ∞), so as to minimize the mass of observations to the right
of the d0 line. In the general case in which individuals value both wage gains and shorter
10Such utility losses could only be rationalized by omitted factors, e.g. measurement error in reported
wages and/or distance, or other relevant components of job utility that are not explicitly considered in this
framework.
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commutes, indifference curves are upward sloping, with β increasing with the value attached
to shorter commutes relative to wage gains.
We estimate β separately for men and women, on workers paid more than 5% above the
(age specific) minimum wage.11 As wages and commutes vary systematically with other job
characteristics that in turn vary by gender, we residualize log wages and distance with respect
to the same controls indicated in the notes to Table 3. We obtain a 0.034 slope for men and
a 0.040 slope for women, rising slightly to 0.037 and 0.043, respectively, when restricting
our sample to job moves that take place within six months of the previous interview date.
While the gender differences detected go in the expected direction, these numbers predict
only small wage compensations for sizeable changes in distance on our sample of job movers.
There are reasons why these estimates may represent a lower bound for the wage-distance
trade-off. First, travel becomes more efficient at longer distances, thus a given rise in dis-
tance may raise the time cost of commute less than proportionally. Second, these estimates
are sensitive to the presence of distance outliers in our sample. To give an example, they
rise to 0.060 and 0.070 for men and women, respectively, when dropping observations with
commuting distances above the 95th percentile (corresponding to 152 km for men and 71
km for women). Conceptually, estimated slopes should capture the wage-distance trade-off
for a set of workers who travel to work the same number of days per week. Otherwise, a
given commute d would not entail the same “cost” to someone commuting to work every day
as to someone who only commutes sporadically. If occasional commuters are oversampled
among distance outliers, the slope estimates obtained on the 95% sample may better ap-
proximate the wage-distance trade-off among regular commuters. Further research is needed
to investigate heterogeneous trade-offs along this and other dimensions.
5 Conclusions
This paper has discussed some of the leading views on the rise in female employment and
wages, involving both gender-specific and gender-neutral forces, and the remaining gender
gaps in most countries’ labor markets. Despite convergence in traditional human capital
11For minimum wage workers the wage return to job mobility would be bounded at zero from below.
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factors, there remain persistence gender differences in “employment location” – by occupa-
tion, industry and firm – as well as in job attributes that are considered important, such as
work flexibility and distance to home. One prominent view is that most of these differences
stem from women’s prevalent role in family responsibilities, which is at least in part related
to gender identity norms and societal attitudes towards gender roles. While gender norms
are indeed evolving in the right direction, their speed of change would be too low to predict
closing gaps anytime soon.
One of the main stylized facts emphasized in this paper is that men and women differ
markedly in their commuting patterns, whereby women’s stronger distaste for commuting
distance may feed into gender gaps in earnings in so far as women are willing to consider
lower pay in return for closer job opportunities. Consistent with this view, women gain less
than men from job mobility in terms of earnings, but gain more in terms of vicinity to new
workplaces. Indirect evidence on this is the fact that the age profile in the commuting gap
closely resembles the age profile in the wage gap. However, despite sizeable gender differences
in commuting and returns to mobility, a simple search model in which men and women face
similar job offer prospects but differ in their willingness to pay for proximity to work delivers
quantitatively modest compensating differentials.
Overall, these points speak to a currently debated issue, on the impact of new technolo-
gies in the labor market and the future of work. Organizational and technological change
have enabled family-friendly workplace practices and broadened opportunities of working
remotely. The growth in the gig economy is challenging conventional norms about where
and when work is undertaken. These changes are expected to steer the structure of work in
directions that are likely beneficial to female work, via a reduction in the cost of flexibility
and declining significance of distance. One downside to be taken into account, however, is the
potential specialization of women in low- or middle-tier occupations that are more perme-
able to non-standard work arrangements. This may in turn reinforce women’s comparative
advantage in non-market work, with possibly negative consequences on gender norms and
aspirations. These should be important avenues for future research.
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Table 2: Shift-share decomposition for the rise in female hours
United States United Kingdom
1940 2017 Change 1977 2017 Change
Share of female hours 0.23 0.44 0.21 0.31 0.42 0.11
Female intensity
Goods 0.12 0.20 0.08 0.19 0.17 -0.02
Services 0.34 0.52 0.18 0.41 0.49 0.08
Share of services 0.51 0.77 0.26 0.52 0.77 0.25
Between-sector component 0.33 0.62
The first row reports the share of female hours in the economy at the start and the end of the sample period
and its change (corresponding to the left-hand side of equation 1). The second and third rows report the
female intensity (as a share of total sector hours) in the goods and service sector, respectively. The average
of start and end female intensities is used to obtain decomposition weights αj . The fourth row reports
the share of services at the start and the end of the sample period and its change (corresponding to ∆ljt).




αfj∆ljt/∆lft). Sample: employed individuals aged 18-65. Source: Census 1940 and ACS 2017 for the
US; LFS for the UK.
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Table 3: Gender differences in the returns to job mobility
Panel A
Sample: Any job change between two consecutive survey dates
Change in (log) wages Change in (log) distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.0026 −0.0031 −0.0259∗∗ −0.0736∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0102) (0.0118)
Constant 0.0683∗∗∗ 0.1877∗∗∗ 0.0812∗∗∗ 0.0989
(0.0015) (0.0289) (0.0075) (0.1490)
Other regressors No Yes No Yes
No. observations 130,831 127,627 124,827 121,752
Panel B
Sample: Any job change within 6 months of last survey date
Change in (log) wages Change in (log) distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female −0.0100∗∗∗ −0.0090∗∗ −0.0225∗ −0.0861∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0132) (0.0151)
Constant 0.0888∗∗∗ 0.1930∗∗∗ 0.0540∗∗∗ 0.1223
(0.0019) (0.0365) (0.0097) (0.1905)
Other regressors No Yes No Yes
No. observations 79,153 76,860 75,666 73,465
The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the change in log hourly wages and in columns 3 and 4 it is the
change in the log one-way distance between the postcode of residence and the postcode of work. Regressions
in columns 2 and 4 also control for: age and age squared, lagged part-time status, lagged temporary contract
status, lagged job tenure, lagged region (11 categories), 1-digit occupation (9 categories), 2-digit industry
(58 categories), and year effects. Sample: employees aged 21-65, excluding multiple job holders. Source:
ASHE, 2002-2019.
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The Figure plots the ratio of female employment over the working age population in the US and six EU
countries (aged 16-64 in the UK and 15-64 in all other countries). Source: UK – 10% Census (1966) and
Office for National Statistics (ONS) estimates based on the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS, 1971 onwards);
US – Census (1940) and International labor Organization (ILO) estimates based on the Current Population
Survey (CPS, 1948 onwards); ILO estimates based on country-specific Labor Force Surveys for all other
countries.
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The Figure plots the difference between median earnings of men and women, relative to median earnings of
men for full-time employees. Source: OECD (https://data.oecd.org/earnwage/gender-wage-gap.htm).
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United States United Kingdom
The Figure plots hours worked in the service sector as a share of total hours. The service sector includes:
Transportation; Post and telecommunications; Wholesale and retail trade; Finance, insurance and real es-
tate; Business and repair services; Personal services; Entertainment; Health; Education; Professional services;
Welfare and no-profit; Public administration. The rest of the economy includes: Primary sectors; Construc-
tion; Manufacturing; Utilities. Sample: employed individuals aged 18-65. Source: Census (1940-2000) and
American Community Survey (2001-2017) for the US; LFS (1977-2017) for the UK;
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Panels A and B plot usual weekly hours worked for men and women, respectively, as well as their sector
components. Sample: individuals aged 18-65, excluding those in fulltime education, retired or in the military.
Source: Census (1940-2000) and American Community Survey (2001-2017) (Ruggles et al, 2020). The dashed
vertical line indicates the first observation on ACS data.








































































Panels A and B plot usual weekly hours worked for men and women, respectively, as well as their sector
components. Sample: individuals aged 18-65, excluding those in fulltime education or retired. Source: UK
LFS (1977-2017).
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Circles represent occupations' employment share in 1980
Panel A: Change in Employment Share by Occupation
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Occupations (ranked by mean log wage in 1980)
Panel B: Service Intensity by Occupation
Panel A plots smoothed employment changes by occupation for all individuals and men and women
separately. We use the balanced panel of occupations for the period 1980-2008 available on
https://www.ddorn.net/data.htm. The occupations (330 categories) are ranked according to the mean log
hourly wage of workers in each occupation in 1980. Panel B plots the smoothed service intensity by occu-
pation, measured by the share of total occupation employment in all service industries combined in 1980
(see notes to Figure 3). Sample: employed individuals aged 18-65. Source: Census and ACS combined,
1980-2007.
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Occupations (ranked by mean log wage in 1980)
Panel B: Service Intensity by Occupation
Panel A plots smoothed employment changes by occupation for all individuals and men and women sepa-
rately. Occupations (55 categories) are ranked according to the mean log weekly wage of workers in each
occupation in 1994. Panel B plots the smoothed service intensity by occupation, measured by the share of
total occupation employment in all service industries combined in 1994 (see notes to Figure 3). Sample:
employed individuals aged 18-65. Source: UK LFS, 1994-2007.
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Figure 8: Gender and the geographic dispersion of jobs in the UK
The Figure plots the female hours share in 2-digit industries against an index of industry of geographic
clustering (see equation 2). Source: UK ASHE and BSD, 2006-2018. The ASHE sample includes employees
aged 21-65. The BSD sample includes all active establishments.
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The Figure plots estimates based on regressions for log commuting distances and log wages in turn, controlling
for year effects, gender, unrestricted age effects and their interaction with gender, industry, occupation and
region effects (61, 9 and 11 categories, respectively), a dummy for fulltime work and a dummy for permanent
contract. Sample: employees aged 21-65. Source: ASHE, 2002-2019.
37
Figure 10: Parenthood and commuting gaps
Long-Run Penalty:
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The Figure plots the percentage change in commuting time of mothers (solid line) and fathers (dashed line)
relative to the year before their first childbirth. The estimates are obtained in an event study that controls
for age and year dummies. The event study coefficients for men and women are statistically different at the
5% level from event time 6 onward. The long-run penalty is obtained as the average penalty from event
time 5 to 10. Sample: individuals who have their first child between 1992-2009 (aged 20-45) and who are
observed in employment at least 8 times during the sample period. Source: BHPS..
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Figure 11: The trade-off between wages and commuting distance
The Figure shows a hypothetical indifference curve between wages and commuting distance and illustrates
the method to identify its slope.
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